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IV. JURISDICTION
Appellant's Brief accurately states jurisdictional elements.

V. ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. See Appellant's Brief pertaining to the issues Appellant raises on appeal,
however Appellant failed to cite to the record when and how the issues were raised.
Neither do the cases appear to set the standard of review, however Appellee represents
that the appropriate standard of review is stated accurately as "clearly erroneous".
B. This appeal should be dismissed since the Notice of Appeal was filed
November 25, 1998 (R at 396.), more than three years after the entry of the final
judgment following trail on November 14,1995 (R at 272.). That judgment was in favor
of the Appellee and also in favor of Appellant on his cross claim against his codefendant.
Appellant did not seek a new trial or other relief until he objected to a garnishment and
requested a hearing on a garnishment filed in September 18,1998. (R at 285 and 353.)
Appellee also failed to request additional time within which to file its Notice of Appeal
following the entry at the judgment in 1995. This Court determines this issue on first
impression under a correctness standard. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321-1322
(Utah 1982). Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809, 810-811 (Utah 1972).
C. Appellee is entitled to recover his attorney's fees incurred in this appeal since
they were provided for in the written contract between the parties, the breach thereof was
the cause of action at trial, further the Appellee was awarded fees at trial. (R. at 7 and
6

272) This Court determines this issues under a correctness standard. Jenkins v. Bailey.
676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984). Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,
617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980).

VL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2).
An action may be brought within six years: (2) upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32.
An attorney and counselor has authority:
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other written instrument
necessary and proper for the prosecution of an action or proceeding about to be or
already commenced, or for the prosecution or defense of any right growing out of
an action, proceeding or final judgment rendered therein.
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding by his
agreement filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not
otherwise.
(3) to receive money claimed by his client in an action or proceeding
during the pendency thereof or after judgment, unless a revocation of his authority
is filed, and, upon payment thereof and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or
acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-33.
The court may on motion or either party an don the showing of reasonable grounds
therefore require the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of the several adverse
parties, to produce or prove by his own oath or otherwise the authority under which he
appears, and until he does so may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of the parties for
whom he assumes to appear.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-34.
The attorney in any action or special proceeding may be changed at any time
before judgment or final determination, as follows:
(1) upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes.
(2) upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the application of the
client, after notice to the attorney.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36.
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party
to an action or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney must, before any further
proceedings are had against him be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to
appoint another attorney or to appear in person.
U.R.C.P. 58A(d) (As adopted in 1995).
Notice ofsigning or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall promptly give
notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of
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service of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision. (As adopted in 1995).
U.R.C.P. 60(a)
Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, order, or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, it any,
as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

The Appellee seeks to recover the balance owing on a written contract for the sale
of an airplane following the default in making payments thereon by the Defendants. The
complaint was filed in the Third District Court on December 22, 1989. (R. at 1.)
Defendant Farr was served with process by a constable. (R. at 10.) Since Defendant
Stanton was a duly licensed practicing attorney, following a conversation with him as a
courtesy a copy was sent by mail, together with a letter dated December 22,1989. (R. at
100.) An answer was filed on January 31, 1990, which did not raise jurisdiction as a
defense by attorney Frank Warner on behalf of both defendants. (R. at 13 and as
Addendum 1 to the brief.) A series of filings, motions, and orders occurred, which are
9

more fully discussed below, which ultimately resulted in a judgment, an Appellee's
complaint, and Appellant's cross-claim following a trial, said judgment being entered
November 15, 1995 (R. at 272.) A garnishment was issued in an effort to collect the
judgment and was served upon Defendant Stanton's employer on September 16, 1998 (R.
at 282 and 1283.) which gave rise to Appellant's requesting a hearing on the garnishment
and again filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. at 285 and 344.) in which he raised the same
issues which had previously been disposed of on several occasions prior to and again at
trial. (R. at 387.) The hearing on garnishment denied relief to Defendant Stanton. (R. at
396.) Defendant Stanton filed his Notice of Appeal on November 25, 1998 (R. at 396.)
on the judgment entered November 15,1995 (R. at 272.) No appeal has been taken from
the judgment on Defendant Stanton's cross-claim against Defendant Fair, which was
entered as part of the original judgment. (R. at 272.)
B.

STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS.
1. Following the commencement of the case through thefilingof the

Complaint (R. at 1.) a copy thereof was mailed to Defendant Stanton, a practicing
attorney. (R. at 100.)
2. An answer was filed by Frank S. Warner, counsel for both Defendants,
January 31, 1990, which raised three defenses but did not raise jurisdiction as
defense, (R. at 13 also contained in the Addendum 1 to this brief.)
3. Appellant Stanton wrote a letter to his counsel, Frank S. Warner, dated
January 31, 1990, and sent a copy to the Court in which he requested the answer be
10

amended to include affirmative defenses and other matters. (R. at 17 and also in
Addendum 2 to this brief.)
4. The Court scheduled an Order to Show Cause for August 24, 1990,
pertaining to the failure to prosecute. (R. at 19.) This was served by mail on
counsel of record but not to Appellant, according to its certificate of service.
5. Several days prior to the hearing discussions occurred between both
counsel and the court clerk since the letter by the Appellant to his counsel (R. at
17.) might be considered an application for change of attorney pursuant to U.C.A.
78-51-34. with the effect of staying proceeding, U.C.A. 78-51-36.
6. Counsel for Appellee understood that the hearing would be stricken
since Appellant did not desire Attorney Warner to continue, he was withdrawing
and Appellee had not received notice of the hearing. (R at 96 and 97.)
7. Appellant Stanton filed with the Court his Renewal of Objection to
Representation, dated August 29, 1990, (R. at 24.) in which it states "COMES
NOW D. Axon Stanton and renews his objection to Frank S. Warner's answer to
the Complaint in his behalf. This objection is based upon the following..."
8. The Court record contains an Order of Dismissal (R. at 21.) dated
August 31,1990, however it was not mailed to counsel or any party.
9. Frank S. Warner withdrew as counsel for both Defendants, withdrawal
having been mailed August 29, 1990. (R. at 22.)
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10. Notice to Appoint Counsel was mailed by Plaintiffs counsel to
Defendants August 31, 1990. (R. at 26.)
11. Appellee filed its Certification of Readiness for Trial March 25, 1990.
(R.at28.)
12. The Court, through its Minute Entry of April 16, 1990, (R at 31.),
directed the case be transferred to the Circuit Court because the amount in
controversy was less than $10,000.
13. An order (duplicate) memorializing the transfer and continuation of
the case was entered November 14,1994. (R. at 36.)
14. A Notice of Transfer of the case was entered December 6, 1994. (R. at
40.)
15. Appellant did not raise any issue concerning the filing of the
Certification of Readiness for Trial or transfer the directive contained in the
Minute Entry.
16. Appellant filed a second Certification of Readiness for Trial January 3,
1995. (R. at 43.)
17. Appellant filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial, dated January 24,
1995, pertaining to the trial scheduled for January 30, 1995. (R. at 66.)
18. The Court granted Appellant's request for continuance through a
Notice of Decision, dated January 26, 1995. (R. at 66.)
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19. Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss January 24, 1995. (R. at 84.)
Appellee filed its memorandum in opposition to said motion February 6, 1995. (R.
at 90.) Appellant filed a reply memorandum February 21, 1995. (R. at 119.) The
Court entered its Notice of Decision denying Appellant's Motion with the
statement, "This Court believes it has jurisdiction to allow this case to continue to
be prosecuted," dated February 24, 1995. (R. at 125.) The Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Related Matters was signed March 21, 1995.
(R. at 128.)
20. The Court granted Appellant's request for a continuance and for filing
cross claim, through an order dated March 21,1995. (R. at 130.)
21. Appellant filed its Motion to Stay Proceedings, dated March 13, 1995.
(R. at 132.) Appellee filed its response March 22, 1995 (R. at 147.) and the Court
denied Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings (see notice dated August 16, 1995,
R. at 161.) and memorialized in the court's order dated August 29, 1995. (R. at
175.)
22. As more fully contained in Appellant's Trial Memorandum, Appellant
again raised as a trial issue the same issues previously denied by the Court in its
prior ruling and those issues raised on appeal by the Appellant. (R. at 191.)
Appellant filed its Memorandum in Response. (R. at 235.)
23. Trial was conducted October 2, 1995, and the Court rendering its
Minute Entry October 11, 1995.
13

24. A proposed Order and Judgment was prepared by counsel for Appellee
and circulated by mail to Appellant on October 25, 1995. (R. at 267 - 274.)
Appellant filed its Notice of Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law with the Court November 3, 1995. (R. at 251.) Appellee filed a Motion for
Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment
referencing Appellant's Objection on the said motion being dated November 9,
1995. (R. at 264.) The Court signed the Judgment, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law November 14, 1995, and they were entered by the clerk
November 15, 1995. (R. at 267 - 274.) Appellant sought no further relief until he
filed his Objection to the Writ of Garnishment and Motion to Dismiss served on
his employer, dated September 18, 1998. (R. at 285.)
25. Appellee filed his response, dated October 6,1998. (R. at 373.)
26. Following oral argument, the court denied Appellant's objection to the
Write of Garnishment and denied his Motion to Dismiss, the order being dated
October 28, 1998. (R. at 387.)

VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. UNTIMELY APPEAL
This appeal should be denied since it was filed more than three years after the
entry of the final order of the trial court. Appellant never requested a new trial or other
relief which arguably could extend the time within which to file a Notice of Appeal. Nor
14

did he seek relief from this Court to extend the time within which to file a Notice of
Appeal. Therefore the appeal must be dismissed pursuant to the U.R.A.P. 3 and 4.
B. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Appellee is entitled to recovery of its attorney's fees on appeal since the original
cause of action was based upon a contract which provided for attorney's fees, and were
also included in the Judgment entered November 15, 1995. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d
391, 393 (Utah 1984). Management Service Corp. v. Development Associates, supra
409.
C. JURISDICTION
Through the filing of an Answer by his attorney which did not raise jurisdiction as
an issue or defense, Appellant made a general appearance in this case and subjected
himself to jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter.
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The case was commenced December 22, 1989, less than three years after the date
of the written contract which constituted the basis for the cause of action, and as such,
clearly was within the time permitted applicable statutes of limitation
E. WAIVER. LACHES, AND ESTOPPEL
Appellee never requested a continuance or a delay in the proceedings. Appellant
has requested a continuance and a separate stay, the court having granted his continuance
but denied him stay. Any other delays in this case were caused through the delay of the
transfer of the file from the District Court to the Circuit Court and cannot be imputed to
15

the parties. Appellee filed two Certifications of Readiness for Trial, one in the District
Court and one in the Circuit Court in a reasonably prompt manner to move this case to
conclusion. All motions in this case (which arguably may cause delay) werefiledby
Appellant.
F. RULE 11 SANCTIONS
Appellant's assertions are false since each time he has raised the issue of
jurisdiction and other matters they have been denied by the trial court. The confusion
which first occurred in this case was caused solely through the conduct the Appellant, i.e.
writing a letter to his counsel and the Court. If sanctions are appropriate, they should be
applied against Appellant through his raising on three separate occasions the same
essential arguments, which have been denied each time by three different trial judges.
Filing an appeal more than three years after the appeal period has run is inexcusable.

IX. ARGUMENT
A.

UNTIMELY APPEAL.

The judgment on Appellee's complaint and Appellant's cross-claim was entered in
this case November 15, 1995. (R. at 272.) Appellant failed to seek any post-judgment
relief or an extension within which to file his appeal. The Notice of Appeal was filed
November 25,1998, more than three years after the entry of the Judgment, and as such is
time barred. Burgers v. Maiben. supra 1321-1322. Steiner v. State, supra 810-811.
Appellant may argue that under U.R.C.P. 58A(d), notice of the entry of the judgment was
16

not given. Appellant failed to give notice of the judgment on his cross-claim. In any
event, as contained in U.R.C.P. 58A(d) (as effective at the time), "The prevailing party
shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall
file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court...." Both the Appellant and
Appellee were prevailing parties, the Appellant on his cross-claim and the Appellee on
the complaint, so arguably each had the same responsibility of providing notice, and
neither provided such notice. In any event, the rule is clear that "However, the time for
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision."
U.R.C.P. 58A(d).
B.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.

The written contract which is the subject matter of the underlying action provided
for recovery of attorney's fees upon default. (R. at 8.) The trial court awarded attorney's
fees based upon this provision. (R. at 272.) The prevailing party on appeal is entitled to
recover its attorney's fees if they are provided for in the cause of action at trial and
awarded at trial.
C.

JURISDICTION.

Appellant has not disputed that he spoke to counsel for Appellee at the time the
Complaint was filed or that he was forwarded a copy as a courtesy of the Complaint. (R.
at 100.) Appellant was represented by counsel, Mr. Frank Warner, who filed an answer
for the benefit of both Defendants January 31, 1995 (Addendum "1"), which did not raise
jurisdiction as a defense, and as such constitutes a general appearance; "The fact that
17

apparently Mr. Stanton did not agree with the form of the Answer filed by his attorney
does not terminated the Court's jurisdiction which arose over this defendant when his
attorney filed the Answer. The act of filing an Answer constitutes a general appearance.
Barber v.Calder. 522 P.2d 700, 701-702 (Utah 1974).
'4. That an appearance by the defendant for any purpose except a special
appearance to object to jurisdiction over he person constitutes a general
appearance [citations omitted]" Barber, supra, n. 4.'"
"In fact, by asking the Court for any affirmative relief, a Defendant thereby submits
himself or herself to the Court's jurisdiction. Downy, 545 P.2d at 510." Barlow v.
Cappo. 821 P.2d 465,467 (Utah App. 1991) citing Barber v. Calden supra 702n. 4. In
the Answer filed in this matter, affirmative relief was specifically requested for recovery
of attorney's fees, court costs, and other general relief.
Mr. Warner was acting in the role of an attorney for the Appellant when he filed
the Answer, and this fact was acknowledged through the letter written by the Appellant to
Mr. Warner, Addendum "B", in which he concedes representation by requests that the
Answer be amended. Mr. Warner was acting with authority when he filed the Answer,
and as such made the general appearance by the Appellant in this matter. U.C.A.
70-51-32. By filing a copy of the letter to Mr. Warner with the Court, it may provide the
basis for the stay of proceedings by the court, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-51-33 and 36, since
it raises the issue of whether Mr. Warner had authority to continue to represent the
Appellant. Discussion of the circumstance occurred between counsel and the court clerk
18

prior to the scheduled to the Order to Show Cause hearing (the Appellant had not
received notice of the hearing according to the Certificate of Mailing). (R. at 100.)
Appellee's counsel understood from the court clerk the hearing would not be conducted
based upon this confusion. (R. at 100 - 101.) The Order of Dismissal entered as a result
of the Order to Show Cause hearing was not served by the clerk on anyone. (R. at 21.) By
the continued filings of the parties, it is a clear indication that no one understood the case
was dismissed, including the Court, since by its Minute Entry transferred the case to the
Circuit court April 16, 1990. The record does not disclose why the case was not
transferred by the District Court to the Circuit Court for some time, and only occurred
after a duplicate order was entered on November 14,1994. (R. at 36.)
Appellant asserts that the Order of Dismissal was an adjudication on the merits,
which is false. The Order was entered erroneously by the Court. It is evident the Court
believed the case was continuing through the entry of the Minute Entry transferring the
case to the Circuit Court following receipt of the Certificate of Readiness for Trial. (R. at
28 and 31.) "U.R.C.P. 4 IB is 'appropriately applied when the trial judge finds that the
Claimant has either failed to make out a prime facia case or when the trial judge is not
persuaded by the evidence presented by the Claimant.' Lemon v. Coats, 735 P.2d 58, 60
(Utah 1987)." Southern Title Guarantee, Co., v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah App.
1988).
It is clear as a result of Appellant's filing Renewal of Objection to Representation
that he did not desire Mr. Warner to continue to represent him, and Mr. Warner withdrew.
19

(R. at 22 and 24.) Notice to Appoint Counsel was promptly given August 31, 1990. (R. at
26.)
The Court has a power pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(a) to correct its orders which do
not accurately reflect the result of its judgment. Specifically,
"It is well established that the Court may vacate, set aside, or modify its
orders or judgments entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not accurately
reflect the result of its judgment. ...This act [signing the prior order] did not reflect
his judgment, and, therefore, does not represent an error in judgment on his part. It
was a mistake of perfunctory or clerical nature apparently resultingfroman
erroneous assumption.... It is a type of error the Court could, and properly did,
correct upon its own motion. The authority of the Court to cause its proceedings
and its judgment and orders to be correctly set forth in the records is necessarily
inherent in its powers for the purpose of administering justice." Meagher v. Equity
Oil Company. 299 P.2d 827, 830(Utah 1956).
U.R.C.P. 60(a)'s purpose is to reflect the intention of the Court. Lindsev v. Adkin.
680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984). Appellant has the burden of showing lack ofjurisdiction
following the entry of a judgment. State of Utah v. ViiiL 784 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Utah
1989).
D.

RES ADJUDICATA.

There has been only one trial in this case, that occurred October 2, 1995, resulting
in the judgment entered November 15,1995. The cases cited by Appellant make it clear
that the adjudication must be on the merits. The order erroneously entered by Judge
Rigtrup August 31,1990, arosefromthe Court's Order to Show Cause in regard to failure
to prosecute, which is unrelated to the merits of the case. The order was vacated upon
discovery (see argument in prior section).
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E.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The contract, the breach of which by the Defendants was the basis for the cause of
action, was dated May 28, 1985. The Defendants subsequently defaulted in payments
thereon in 1987. This case was commenced December 22, 1989. Appellant correctly
makes reference to U.C.A. 78-12-23 as the limitation provision for written instruments,
i.e. the contract, is six years. Under any theory, the case was commenced well within the
six-year limitation period.
F.

WAIVER. LACHES, AND ESTOPPEL.

Appellant accurately references through the cited cases the standard for wavier,
latches, and estoppel. The issues is the due diligence of the Plaintiff in pursuing the cause
of action. Arguably, the Complaint was filed approximately two years after the breach of
contract by the Defendants, well within the six-year statute of limitations. The initial
delays in the case arose as a result of the conduct of the Appellant in objecting through
his letter to his counsel, which was also filed with the Court. Counsel withdrew August
28,1990 (R. at 22.), Notice to Appoint Counsel was served August 31,1990 (R. at 26.),
and thereafter Appellant has represented himself. Appellee filed its Certification of
Readiness for Trial March 25,1991. (R. at 28.) The Court, by Minute Entry, directed the
case be transferred to the Circuit Court April 16,1991. (R. at 31.) The transfer to the
Circuit Court did not occur for approximately three years, however, this is in the control
of the court system and not the Plaintiff. Upon transfer, which occurred December 14,
1994 (R. at 33.), Appellee filed its second Certification of Readiness for Trial on January
21

3, 1995. (R. at 43.) Appellant filed a Motion for Continuance (R. at 66.) which the
granted. (R. at 130.) Subsequently, the Appellant filed a Request for Stay (R. at 132.)
which the Court denied. (R. at 175.) Appellee has never filed a request for continuance or
stay. Any delays by either party in this matter were solely caused by the Appellant.
As found by the trial court:
"5. The defense of laches is unavailable to the Defendant Stanton because
he could, as easily as the Plaintiff, have protected himself by proceeding to secure
the collateral in any loss resulting from Plaintiffs delay in bringing this matter to
trial is equally attributable to Defendant's neglect." (R. at 269.)
Laches are as recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a
disadvantage to the other party. Laches requires two elements: (1) a lack of diligence on
the part of the claimant, and (2) and injury to the Defendant because of the lack of
diligence. Where the Defendant defaulted in the performance of the duty to make
payments would bar the application of this equitable defense. Plateau Mining. Co., v.
Utah Division of Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990). Here only the Appellant has
requested the court to delay the case, which he has done twice. The delay of transferring
thefilefromthe District Court to the Circuit Court is in the control of the court system
and not the parties, therefore such delay cannot be attributable to the parties. Appellee
filed two Certifications of Readiness for Trial to make it certain that he desired to have
the case heard. The same elements essentially apply in the case of equitable estoppel.
Utah Department of Transportation v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc., 751 P.2d 270,
271 (Utah App. 1988).
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G.

RULE 11 SANCTIONS.

The Appellant has asserted the arguments relating to jurisdiction, waiver, estoppel,
and similar matters on three occasions before the trial court and the relief has been denied
each time by three different judges. (R. at 128, 175 and 272.) The initial confusion
between Appellant and his prior counsel, Mr. Warner, may provided the basis for this
court's consideration of Rule 11 sanctions against Appellant since it was his conduct
through forwarding a copy of a letter to the Court raising various issues that created the
confusion pertaining to the Order to Show Cause hearing in August, 1990. Taylor v.
Estate of Grant Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 172 (Utah App. 1989).
Appellee's counsel, in pursuing this case, relied upon consistent orders of four
different judges at the trial level. Reliance upon existing law to the extent they were
based on an outstanding order of the trial judge is appropriate. Crowther v. Mower, 876
P.2d 876, 880 (Utah App. 1994), reversing the trial court's award of attorney's fees for
Rule 11 sanctions. The standard for review is a three-pronged test set forth in Barnard v.
Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1233-1234 (Utah 1992). Trial court denied the relief requested by
Appellant. Requests for attorney's fees by a pro se party who is also an attorney is
contrary to the laws of this state.
"There are other compelling public policy reasons for holding that 'pro se litigants'
should not recover attorney's fees, regardless of their professional status. ...it is
axiomatic that effective legal representation is dependent not only on legal
expertise, but also on a detached and objective perspective. The lawyer who
represents himself necessarily falls short of the latter." Jones. Waldo. Holbrook &
McDonough v.Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366,1375 (Utah 1996).
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Appellee requests the Court to consider sanctions pursuant to U.R.A.P. 40
concerning Appellee's obligation to defend this appeal, which was commenced three
years after judgment rendered.

X. CONCLUSION STATING RELIEF SOUGHT
The appeal should be dismissed, since it has been brought three years after the
entry of the order. Since the action was based upon a contract providing for attorney's
fees, Appellant should be ordered to pay the reasonable attorney's fees of Appellee in this
process, or in the alternative is a sanction.

XI. ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff7Appellee does not request oral argument.

DATED this ^ L day of June, 1999.

David C. Anderson
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's
Brief, postage fully prepaid this /yday

of June, 1999, to the following:

D. Aron Stanton
352 Denver St., #226
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

And-Dale/Appdlee's Brief
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ADDENDUM "1"

FRANK S. WARNER (3387)
WARNER & PHILLIPS
505 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-6540
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oo0oo
DALE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

A N S W E R

vs.
ROBERT S. FARR and,
D. ARON STANTON,

C i v i l No.

8^ (? ,q

ItslfiC

PM^W'f

Defendant.
-OO0OO

COME NOW Defendants Robert S. Farr and D. Aron Stanton by and
through their attorney, Frank S. Warner, and answer Plaintiff's
Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1
of Plaintiff's Complaint.
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2
of Plaintiff's Complaint.
3. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 3
of Plaintiff's Complaint.
4. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 4
of Plaintiff's Complaint.
5. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 5,
6, 7, 8, and 9 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

7U

6. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 10
of Plaintiff's Complaint.
7. Defendants are without sufficient information and knowledge
to answer the allegations contained in paragraphs 11/ 12/ 13 and
14 of Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore denys the same.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Defendants have paid sums to the Plaintiff in addition to
those set forth on Exhibit B to the Complaint for which Plaintiff
has given Defendants no credit and

the amount due/ if any; is

substantially less than the amount claimed by Plaintiff.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted.
WHEREFORE/ Defendant Farr prays:
1. Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed and that Plaintiff take
nothing thereby.
2. Attorney's fees and Court costs incurred herein.
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem
proper.
DATED this ^^?day> of/January / 1990.<

t^J/i
^PRANK S. WARNER
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

"Answer" to Attorney for the Plaintiff, Mr. David C.

Anderson, 185 South State Street, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84111.
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ADDENDUM "2"

PLEASE FILE THlS

A.ron Slanfon PoOo

UN5F.R CASE NO.

,

£8C-213'7

Attorney A t L a w

January 31, 1990

Frank S. Warner
WARNER & PHILLIPS
505-27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Dale Anderson vs. Robert S. Farr and D. Aron Stanton

Dear Mr. Warner:
In our telephone conversation last week you asked you be
allowed to represent me at Mr. Farr's expense in the defense of
this lawsuit. There were discussions to my position. That
position you already knew and is outlined as follows:
1.
On the 31st day of December, 1985, Robert S. Farr
purchased all my rights and obligations in the aircraft in
question and agreed to hold me harmless therefrom under the
obligations of the contract that both of us had entered into
with Dale Anderson.
You also stated Robert Farr was aware of this and wanted
to hold me harmless under the terms of our contract. However,
in your answer in my behalfr you did not allege any affirmative
defenses such as outlined above. You assured me you would do
this if I allowed you to answer in my behalf. I do not want to
lose that affirmative defense. I request you file an amended
answer outlining my defense or I will ask you to withdraw as my
counsel and the answer.
If you recall, I told you I had not been brought under the
jurisdiction of the Court for I had not been served. I do not
want to make an appearance without making sure all my rights are
protected.
I know the airplane is worth more than what is owed. If
Mr. Farr is going to sell the airplane and split the surplus, I
will let the answer stand.

Salt L«*k.-C;</, I'tJ. <V:u>)

A copy of this letter will be forwarded to Mr. Warner, and
the Court.
If you have any questions or comments/ please do not hesitate
to call me at 487-9732.
Very vtruly yours,

Atto«*ey at Law

AS/vh
cc: " File
Frank S. W<
Court
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